JUSTIFYING ILLEGAL DIRECT ACTION:
- so when it's violent + protesters don't submit to punishment
- most agree that violence isn't justified if it harms innocent people, even in war soldiers usually don't target unarmed combatants
- others believe that it is justified if it attacks people who are associated with or contribute to the injustice e.g. attacking those who wear fur, or work in laboratories which test on animals
- hobbes + locke: violence is hard to justify because it threatens our security and one of the main reasons why the state was set up in the first place was to protect people -> so would seem like a contradiction to advocate violence
- HOWEVER, could argue that it's a matter of what the specific injustice is e.g. french citizens resisting nazi's in WWII most would agree is justified
Wednesday 13 May 2015
JUSTIFYING CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
- in plato's 'crito' -> socrates: breaking the law is NEVER justified even if the state treats you bad -> obligation to obey under any circumstance bc of the benefits the law provides -> living under the state = agreeing to obey (tacit consent)
- rawls, CD is justified under certain conditions:
1) when all legal attempts to make change have failed SO CD is last resort HOWEVER -> who decides when all legal attempts have been justified? who decides when to stop campaigning?
2) if it is non-violent -> violence is never justified as it increases overall threat for citizens -> HOWEVER -> use of violence should be considered case-by-case -> surely it can sometimes be necessary (and therefore justified) under unjust states e.g. french citizens resisting against the nazi's in WW2
ronald dworkin:
- we have a right to civil disobedience when the law wrongly violates our other rights (e.g. human rights, for example the right to choose my own religion)
- however, we don't have a GENERAL right to CD -> needs to be considered case-by-case + cases need to be exceptional
- we DO have the right to dissent legally (bc consent is the basis of political obligation)
- if the state fails to protect this right + our others, then CD is justified
need to consider:
1) consequences:
- because CD can cause harm to society (e.g. encourage further disrespect for the law, create conflict amongst opposing sides on an issue)
- aim must have a REALISTIC chance of being achieved, otherwise the potential negative effects of CD outweigh the act itself
HOWEVER- can avoid negative consequences by:
- being willing to submit to punishment - shows respect for the law -> minimises further disrespect -> also shows genuinely believe in the issue they are righting for -> may increase respect from opposer's and thus decrease any hostility/conflict
2) motivation:
- RAWLS- must be a clear + substantial injustice to motivate CD -> only something v serious could justify breaking the law
HOWEVER, could argue that even things that aren't considered to be major societal issues should still be protested if people believe in them - for example, parents illegally blocking a road to protest getting a crossing installed for their children -> SO it's arguably more important that the act is proportional to the end, rather than the act being considered socially significant
- MILL - we should be GRATEFUL for protesters -> help us think for ourselves + change is good if it's in the right direction -> healthy for politics
- rather than think protesters are annoying/irritating -> appreciate their contribution for change in society -> can be beneficial -> after-all change is how we progress as a society and no great change has ever been achieved by sticking to the status quo
- in plato's 'crito' -> socrates: breaking the law is NEVER justified even if the state treats you bad -> obligation to obey under any circumstance bc of the benefits the law provides -> living under the state = agreeing to obey (tacit consent)
- rawls, CD is justified under certain conditions:
1) when all legal attempts to make change have failed SO CD is last resort HOWEVER -> who decides when all legal attempts have been justified? who decides when to stop campaigning?
2) if it is non-violent -> violence is never justified as it increases overall threat for citizens -> HOWEVER -> use of violence should be considered case-by-case -> surely it can sometimes be necessary (and therefore justified) under unjust states e.g. french citizens resisting against the nazi's in WW2
ronald dworkin:
- we have a right to civil disobedience when the law wrongly violates our other rights (e.g. human rights, for example the right to choose my own religion)
- however, we don't have a GENERAL right to CD -> needs to be considered case-by-case + cases need to be exceptional
- we DO have the right to dissent legally (bc consent is the basis of political obligation)
- if the state fails to protect this right + our others, then CD is justified
need to consider:
1) consequences:
- because CD can cause harm to society (e.g. encourage further disrespect for the law, create conflict amongst opposing sides on an issue)
- aim must have a REALISTIC chance of being achieved, otherwise the potential negative effects of CD outweigh the act itself
HOWEVER- can avoid negative consequences by:
- being willing to submit to punishment - shows respect for the law -> minimises further disrespect -> also shows genuinely believe in the issue they are righting for -> may increase respect from opposer's and thus decrease any hostility/conflict
2) motivation:
- RAWLS- must be a clear + substantial injustice to motivate CD -> only something v serious could justify breaking the law
HOWEVER, could argue that even things that aren't considered to be major societal issues should still be protested if people believe in them - for example, parents illegally blocking a road to protest getting a crossing installed for their children -> SO it's arguably more important that the act is proportional to the end, rather than the act being considered socially significant
- MILL - we should be GRATEFUL for protesters -> help us think for ourselves + change is good if it's in the right direction -> healthy for politics
- rather than think protesters are annoying/irritating -> appreciate their contribution for change in society -> can be beneficial -> after-all change is how we progress as a society and no great change has ever been achieved by sticking to the status quo
DIRECT ACTION:
- legal e.g. organised demonstrations agreed with police beforehand -> non-violent
- illegal e.g. breaking into a lab to release animals
DEFINING CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
- type of illegal direct action
- rawls' definition: public, non-violent, conscientious (yet political) breach of the law, with the aim of bringing about a change in laws or government policy
1) public - motives communicated with rest of society
HOWEVER not all acts of CD should be public, e.g. releasing lab animals would prevent act from working
2) non-violent - may not be justified, but can still count as CD
- some violence may not be justified but is necessary: e.g. small amounts of violence with a proper moral focus in mind
- big amounts of violence with no particular aim in mind = more like rioting -> not considered C.D.
3) breach of the law
- CD is always illegal
- in liberal democracies the act of CD itself isn't punished but the crime committed in the act e.g. trespassing
4) conscientious yet political
- a belief in what is being protested -> genuinely believe it is damaging to society
- trying to actually change the law
- e.g. suffragettes to get women's vote + MLK civil rights movement
HOWEVER, rawls places emphasis on CD being political, however, this ignores CD towards social institutions such as companies + universities
- legal e.g. organised demonstrations agreed with police beforehand -> non-violent
- illegal e.g. breaking into a lab to release animals
DEFINING CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
- type of illegal direct action
- rawls' definition: public, non-violent, conscientious (yet political) breach of the law, with the aim of bringing about a change in laws or government policy
1) public - motives communicated with rest of society
HOWEVER not all acts of CD should be public, e.g. releasing lab animals would prevent act from working
2) non-violent - may not be justified, but can still count as CD
- some violence may not be justified but is necessary: e.g. small amounts of violence with a proper moral focus in mind
- big amounts of violence with no particular aim in mind = more like rioting -> not considered C.D.
3) breach of the law
- CD is always illegal
- in liberal democracies the act of CD itself isn't punished but the crime committed in the act e.g. trespassing
4) conscientious yet political
- a belief in what is being protested -> genuinely believe it is damaging to society
- trying to actually change the law
- e.g. suffragettes to get women's vote + MLK civil rights movement
HOWEVER, rawls places emphasis on CD being political, however, this ignores CD towards social institutions such as companies + universities
locke: believes political obligation relies on the consent of its citizens
- consent must be meaningful -> can't be forced/coerced -> must be able to refuse consent (dissent) -> otherwise there is no political obligation
HOWEVER, dissenting does = no political obligation -> there are limits (legal dissent) -> this protects our right to dissent + expression of dissent
types of legal dissent: protest, pressure groups, protest voting
HOWEVER argue: legal dissent doesn't have equal influence/impact on social issues -> THUS doesn't protect our equality
illegal dissent:
1) conscientious objection: not actually trying to change law / morally disagree with a particular law / but don't have problem with others obeying it - just want to protect personal moral values e.g. pacifist refusal to join army -> not a threat bc generally obey the law + thus accept any punishment given to them... so best to give a lenient punishment (still have to be punished bc still breaking the law) + social consequences = minimal -> can be justified in court by explaining moral views + thus why they refuse to obey a particular law
2) revolution: aim to change every component of the state (it's laws, it's rulers etc)
this is justified when:
locke: when state fails to provide the benefit of uniform punishment
hobbes: state fails to provide benefits (protection)
justifying dissent: locke
- point of state = provide protection of uniform punishment + enforcing the LoN
- if state does this = has tacit consent of citizens
- if fails to do this = citizens have the right to dissent
HOWEVER:
Locke assumes citizens are
1) informed: that they know whether the state is enforcing the laws of nature -> might be unaware -> THUS won't know whether to give consent or not
2) rational: perhaps even if the state provides what its supposed to citizens might still dissent bc perhaps they aren't rational enough to acknowledge the long-term advantages
lock: only the majority have the right to dissent
- bc allowing individuals to dissent brings back problem of state of nature: individual judgements = conflict
HOWEVER- basically saying that if the majority are happy with the way things are then the minority's opinion isn't to be taken into account -> what about a society where the majority control an unjust society and the minority suffers? surely dissent is justified then e.g. a majority exploiting a minority for unfairly cheap labour -> seems wrong that the minority simply aren't justified to dissent.
- ALSO disregards freedom + equality + autonomy of the individual
- consent must be meaningful -> can't be forced/coerced -> must be able to refuse consent (dissent) -> otherwise there is no political obligation
HOWEVER, dissenting does = no political obligation -> there are limits (legal dissent) -> this protects our right to dissent + expression of dissent
types of legal dissent: protest, pressure groups, protest voting
HOWEVER argue: legal dissent doesn't have equal influence/impact on social issues -> THUS doesn't protect our equality
illegal dissent:
1) conscientious objection: not actually trying to change law / morally disagree with a particular law / but don't have problem with others obeying it - just want to protect personal moral values e.g. pacifist refusal to join army -> not a threat bc generally obey the law + thus accept any punishment given to them... so best to give a lenient punishment (still have to be punished bc still breaking the law) + social consequences = minimal -> can be justified in court by explaining moral views + thus why they refuse to obey a particular law
2) revolution: aim to change every component of the state (it's laws, it's rulers etc)
this is justified when:
locke: when state fails to provide the benefit of uniform punishment
hobbes: state fails to provide benefits (protection)
justifying dissent: locke
- point of state = provide protection of uniform punishment + enforcing the LoN
- if state does this = has tacit consent of citizens
- if fails to do this = citizens have the right to dissent
HOWEVER:
Locke assumes citizens are
1) informed: that they know whether the state is enforcing the laws of nature -> might be unaware -> THUS won't know whether to give consent or not
2) rational: perhaps even if the state provides what its supposed to citizens might still dissent bc perhaps they aren't rational enough to acknowledge the long-term advantages
lock: only the majority have the right to dissent
- bc allowing individuals to dissent brings back problem of state of nature: individual judgements = conflict
HOWEVER- basically saying that if the majority are happy with the way things are then the minority's opinion isn't to be taken into account -> what about a society where the majority control an unjust society and the minority suffers? surely dissent is justified then e.g. a majority exploiting a minority for unfairly cheap labour -> seems wrong that the minority simply aren't justified to dissent.
- ALSO disregards freedom + equality + autonomy of the individual
political obligation -> need consent
to have genuine authority -> state need to be legitimate (not just have power)
DOES LEGITIMACY REQUIRE POPULAR APPROVAL?
- argument: people are likely to approve if:
1) state provides benefits (hobbes)
2) citizens give their consent (locke)
- SO maybe the basis of legitimacy is popular approval?
PLATO'S OBJECTION:
- legitimacy based on theoretical authority (people w expertise who can provide knowledge for example, viewing an engineer as an authority when building a bridge bc trust their skills + expertise)
- democracy = freedom to choose what citizens want for themselves
- citizens = irrational desires + emotions + prejudices
- SO won't vote for what's best for the state but rather what is best for THEM
- SO freedom is harmful
- beast analogy: citizens = beast / rulers = tamers -> rulers will try to accommodate citizens to keep them happy -> so also won't be doing what's best for the state
- what citizens WANT isn't necessarily what is GOOD :( -> won't contribute to the common good, which plato believes is the purpose of the state
OBJECTIONS TO PLATO:
- hume: what people want + what is good = same thing ---> PLATO: people are confused about what they want
- ignores importance of freedom + equality > important -> shouldn't force people to obey ---> undermines human moral judgements -> perhaps humans are able to decide what is good for the state whilst also accommodating their own needs -> perhaps they aren't as selfish as plato implies
- even theoretical authorities (experts) mess up too -> are human -> driven by irrational emotions + desires + prejudices
- churchill: democracy is the worst form of government, except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time -> democracy = best option -> other forms of gov = prone to corruption e.g. stalinist russia. -> easy to point out the flaws in democracy, but not easy to suggest a more effective option THUS pointless argument
POWER + AUTHORITY
- power = ability to get others to do things even when they don't want to (either through persuasion or coercion)
- if a state has power it is likely to have practical authority (obeying simply bc authority figure, can get people to act how they want bc they have power)
HOWEVER, two types of practical authority:
- descriptive practical authority: literally just ability to enforce laws and whereby citizens generally obey laws
- normative practical authority: where there is descriptive authority + the state is legitimate
- JUST having power isn't necessarily seen as having genuine authority bc citizens could simply be obeying because they are scared, not because they consent to do so.
- SO simply having power = likely to have descriptive practical authority
- BUT having power + being legitimate = normative practical authority
- HOBBES argues that any state with descriptive practical authority = legitimate
- others emphasise that there's a difference between simply having power + having genuine authority -> they argue that to be a genuine authority require legitimacy
- power = ability to get others to do things even when they don't want to (either through persuasion or coercion)
- if a state has power it is likely to have practical authority (obeying simply bc authority figure, can get people to act how they want bc they have power)
HOWEVER, two types of practical authority:
- descriptive practical authority: literally just ability to enforce laws and whereby citizens generally obey laws
- normative practical authority: where there is descriptive authority + the state is legitimate
- JUST having power isn't necessarily seen as having genuine authority bc citizens could simply be obeying because they are scared, not because they consent to do so.
- SO simply having power = likely to have descriptive practical authority
- BUT having power + being legitimate = normative practical authority
- HOBBES argues that any state with descriptive practical authority = legitimate
- others emphasise that there's a difference between simply having power + having genuine authority -> they argue that to be a genuine authority require legitimacy
POLITICAL OBLIGATION:
- obeying the law bc it's the law (not for individual moral reasons bc then would only obey particular laws)
- argument: if humans are free + equal, why should we be bound by the law? shouldn't we be able to do what we want?
- philosophers: we must have agreed to obey the state i.e. we must have given consent somehow, thus giving us political obligation.
EXPLICIT:
- literally/overtly agreeing to set up a government and to follow it's rules -> P.O.
- only relevant to first ever generation
- later generations born into it
- established society = no P.O. if it rests on explicit consent
----could argue voting = form of E.C - BUT voting for an oppositional party to the winning party = not consenting the winner
- E.C. = if i say 'i do not consent' then i have no P.O.
TACIT:
- locke: implied consent -> this is gained through utilising what the state owns/offers -> e.g. simply living in a place means i give tacit consent
HOWEVER: hume: what about those who don't have the choice/money to leave the country? e.g. a peasant. implausible to say this is still giving consent
- doesn't make sense = me walking on a street means i give consent? meaningless if citizens aren't aware of it or don't know what it means
VOTING tacit consent: in a way YES bc voting means voluntarily take part in system -> agreeing to play by the rules
- NO: what about revolutionary vote? a party which promises revolution thus abolition of the state -> if they don't win then surely i don't necessarily give my consent?
HYPOTHETICAL:
- where consent is given if it would be rational to do so
- SO in state of nature it is argued that it's rational to obey the law
HOWEVER:
- just bc rational in SoN doesn't make it rational now - completely different circumstances.. irrelevant point to make
- ALSO just bc it's rational doesn't mean i do? maybe i am irrational. -> i should have freedom to choose however i want
- obeying the law bc it's the law (not for individual moral reasons bc then would only obey particular laws)
- argument: if humans are free + equal, why should we be bound by the law? shouldn't we be able to do what we want?
- philosophers: we must have agreed to obey the state i.e. we must have given consent somehow, thus giving us political obligation.
EXPLICIT:
- literally/overtly agreeing to set up a government and to follow it's rules -> P.O.
- only relevant to first ever generation
- later generations born into it
- established society = no P.O. if it rests on explicit consent
----could argue voting = form of E.C - BUT voting for an oppositional party to the winning party = not consenting the winner
- E.C. = if i say 'i do not consent' then i have no P.O.
TACIT:
- locke: implied consent -> this is gained through utilising what the state owns/offers -> e.g. simply living in a place means i give tacit consent
HOWEVER: hume: what about those who don't have the choice/money to leave the country? e.g. a peasant. implausible to say this is still giving consent
- doesn't make sense = me walking on a street means i give consent? meaningless if citizens aren't aware of it or don't know what it means
VOTING tacit consent: in a way YES bc voting means voluntarily take part in system -> agreeing to play by the rules
- NO: what about revolutionary vote? a party which promises revolution thus abolition of the state -> if they don't win then surely i don't necessarily give my consent?
HYPOTHETICAL:
- where consent is given if it would be rational to do so
- SO in state of nature it is argued that it's rational to obey the law
HOWEVER:
- just bc rational in SoN doesn't make it rational now - completely different circumstances.. irrelevant point to make
- ALSO just bc it's rational doesn't mean i do? maybe i am irrational. -> i should have freedom to choose however i want
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